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Abstract 
This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in 
discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various 
commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family 
size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We 
then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 
4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regression. Whereas we establish a 
robust and significant link between patent quality and value in samples of 
discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents 
that are essential to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality 
factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. 
We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in 
discrete innovation, this link is much weaker in cumulative innovation. 
Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. 
There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between 
quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the 
literature. 
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Introduction 
 
Patents play an important role in modern economies, and especially in the growing sector of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). At the same time, especially in the ICT 
sector, the role played by patents is seen with increasing suspicion. While the number of ICT 
patents increases sharply, it is debated whether this increase in patents reflects an increase in 
innovation. It is a widely shared belief that an important share of the numerous ICT patents is 
of questionable quality and low commercial value. Furthermore, there is skepticism about the 
contribution of these numerous patents to technological progress in ICT industries that is 
characterized by strongly cumulative innovation. Many scholars raise concerns that 
cumulative innovation might be stifled in what develops to become a dense “patent thicket”. 
 
Patent thickets are webs of overlapping and mutually blocking patents held by different 
owners. Mutually blocking patent rights result from cumulative innovation, where no 
technological component can be marketed individually without the technological 
complements potentially protected by patent rights of different companies. Patent thickets 
have a clear impact on patent strategies, as they provide incentives to file blocking patents. 
Blocking patents are filed to force companies practicing an existing technology into licensing 
and profit sharing, rather than to develop a new activity on a production market. For many 
economists, patent thickets weaken the patent system by reducing returns on significant 
innovations through patent inflation and litigation, while allowing “patent trolls” to earn much 
on patents of dubious technological significance. The core prediction of the patent thicket 
theory is thus that the link between patent quality and patent value erodes. If the link between 
the value of a patent and the significance of the underlying innovation is weakened, so is the 
capacity of the patent system to reward innovators for socially desirable innovation activity. 
We will therefore address the crucial issue of the link between patent quality and patent value 
with a special focus on those fields where innovation is most cumulative. 
 
Probably the most prominent sector characterized by cumulative innovation is ICT, and more 
particularly those markets shaped by standardization. Elsewhere, one of the main debates 
around standardization concerns the sharing of royalty surplus between the Intellectual 
Property owners of cumulative innovation (Swanson & Baumol, 2005; Salant, 2009). 
Standardization is a common feature of modern ICT industries and conditions highly 
profitable markets such as mobile telephony, wireless communication, digital data processing 
and consumer electronics. Standards are means of ensuring compatibility between 
technological components. Standardization thus locks in the markets into technological 
options and ties complementary technologies together. Often, these technologies are protected 
by essential patents. A patent is said essential for a standard if there is no possibility of 
implementing the standard without infringing upon the standard. Through standardization, 
these patents thus gain blocking power over the whole standard. Important cases of litigation, 
such as the cases on the conduct of Qualcomm and Rambus, provide evidence of strong 
disagreements among companies, as manufacturing companies claim to be “held up” by 
owners of essential patents asking for disproportionate royalties. Competition law and the 
Intellectual Property rules of Standardization Organizations provide for a specific regime of 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Licensing Conditions, but industry participants disagree 
on whether this regime is efficient in yielding reasonable prices for licensing essential patents. 
 
Going beyond the narrowly defined, yet extremely important, technology markets around 
formal standardization, there are attempts in the literature to identify whole technological 
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classes in which technology is more cumulative. These attempts yielded a categorization of 
technology classes into discrete and complex technologies. Even though the concrete 
classification varies from study to study, ICT technologies are consistently classified as 
complex technology field. These technologies are indeed characterized by high citation rates 
among patents, indicating stronger cumulativeness of research (Nagaokia, 2005), and a strong 
presence of mutually blocking patent rights (Von Graevenitz et al. 2009). In several empirical 
studies of the capacity of patent quality indicators to predict patent value, electronics and 
other “complex” technological fields have revealed a low link between quality indicators and 
value. Nevertheless, none of these studies has clearly established whether cumulativeness is 
driving this apparently lower link between indicators of patent quality and value. In particular, 
these studies do not tell whether the link is weaker because the link between quality and value 
is weakened or because the indicators are themselves less informative of the underlying 
concepts quality and value. It is an important contribution of the present study to disentangle 
these issues. Furthermore, we will analyze whether particularities of patents from “complex” 
technology classes are due to the cumulativeness of research by comparing random complex 
technology patents to patents that are essential to technological standard. 
 
We will therefore study three different samples of patents. The first sample is made of patents 
declared as essential to technological standards, and allows testing directly the characteristics 
of cumulative innovation. In order to analyze whether these effects are specific to essential 
patents or rather relate to the broader technological field, we compare our sample of essential 
patents with a control sample of sibling patents from the same technological classes as the 
essential patents. We make sure that this sample consists only of patents from technological 
fields identified as “complex” by the related literature. Finally, we introduce a third sample of 
patents with the same application years as our two other samples, but randomly drawn from 
patent classes that are clearly identified as “discrete” by the related literature. We then 
compare the link between patent quality and value from sample to sample.  
 
This is the first study using a broad range of patent quality indicators to address this issue. All 
these indicators are observable characteristics of a patent - like the number of claims or the 
number of times a patent is cited by posterior patents - that are believed to be driven by patent 
quality. Even though any of these indicators is likely to be noisy, using compound indicators 
reduces the noise and increases the likelihood of capturing the significance or quality of 
patents. Furthermore, we capture the value of patents by predicting the likelihood of renewal 
after 4, 8 and 12 years of patent terms and check the robustness of our results by using 
litigation data as alternative measure of commercial value. 
 
We will in a first step analyze the validity of the quality indicators. Our analysis concentrates 
on six indicators of patent quality: forward citations, backward citations, number of claims, 
family size, and originality and generality indices. Factor analysis will reveal that in all 
samples there are two rather than one common factor driving the data. We can identify a 
quality factor driven by forward citations, claims and family size that is consistent throughout 
the samples. These quality indicators have however a much stronger covariance in discrete 
than in complex technology patents. A second factor, which we identify as basicness or 
fundamentality of the patent, is particularly important for complex technology patents and 
especially for essential patents. Nevertheless, this factor is irrelevant for predicting patent 
value.  
 
In a second step, we use the quality factor established through factor analysis to explain patent 
value through renewal and litigation analysis. In spite of the lower covariance of patent 
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quality indicators in complex technologies, both the quality factor and single indicators 
perform well for predicting patent value and litigation in this sample. By contrast, in the 
sample of essential patents, neither compound nor single indicators have any predictive power 
for explaining patent renewal or litigation. We can rule out that this lack of explanatory power 
is due to weakness of quality indicators. Indeed, the indicators are even less noisy for essential 
patents than for the other patents from complex technology classes. Rather, we conclude that 
there is no link between patent quality and patent value in strongly cumulative innovation as 
for instance in standardized technologies. Nevertheless, this finding is specific to the sample 
of essential patents and cannot be generalized to the relevant patent classes.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part I summarizes the literature and 
sketches the theoretical background of the analysis. Part II describes the data and discusses 
the construction of the samples. Part III summarizes the results of the factor analysis. In Part 
IV, we will describe how the quality factor performs in predicting patent value as measured 
through patent renewals. Part V discusses the implications of our results for policy and 
research methodology.  
 
I. Theoretical background, literature review 
 
 
It is the aim of this part to provide an overview over the literature. In the first part, we will 
summarize the economic literature on patent indicators and the measurement of patent quality. 
In the second part, we will discuss results of the literature using these indicators to analyze the 
relationship between patent quality and patent value. In both parts we will focus particularly 
on the distinction between discrete and cumulative innovation and between discrete and 
complex technology classes. 
 
I.1 Measuring patent quality and value: the literature on patent 
indicators 
 
There is a longstanding tradition in economic research to rely upon patent data to measure the 
output of innovative activity. Nevertheless, patents are very heterogeneous, as some patents 
are very important, while many patents are never used. As this heterogeneity of patents 
reduces the significance of patent counts as measure of innovation output, empirical research 
routinely weights patent counts by indicators of the importance of the underlying technology. 
This importance of the underlying technology is referred to as patent quality and could 
alternatively be defined as the size of the inventive step protected by the patent or as the 
relevance of the underlying technology for future use by follow-up innovators. This concept 
has also been referred to as social value of the patent, i.e. the value added by the protected 
technology independently of who appropriates this value.  
 
Various strategies exist to compare the quality of patents: the literature has used e.g. expert 
rankings, case studies, or survey analysis. Nevertheless, these strategies are not available for 
studies of broad technological sectors with a very high number of relevant patents. Therefore 
the economic literature systematically relies upon indicators of patent quality. Indicators are 
quantitative patent characteristics that are easily observable and are thought to reflect patent 
quality. 
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The most commonly used indicators are the number of citations a patent receives by posterior 
patents (so-called forward citations), the number of claims, and the size of the patent family 
(i.e. the number of international patent files with the same priority patent) (Griliches, 1990). 
Other indicators of patent quality include the number of backward cites, i.e. the number of 
patents cited as prior art and the patent’s generality index (measuring the dispersion of prior 
art over technology classes) and originality index (measuring the dispersion of citing patents 
over technology classes). Table 1 summarizes the main indicators of patent quality used in the 
literature. 
 
Name of the Indicator Description Justification 
Forward cites Number of citations received 
by posterior patents 
Indicates the relevance of the 
patent for further research 
Backward cites Number of citations made to 
previous patents 
Indicates the extent to which 
the patent makes use of the 
existing prior art 
Number of claims The number of priority 
claims made in the patent 
Indicates the breadth of the 
technology claimed by the 
patent holder 
Family size The number of international 
patents filed for the same 
priority patent 
Indicates that a patent is 
important on an international 
scale, and that its holder is 
willing to incur high 
application costs 
Generality Dispersion of cited patents 
over technology classes 
Indicates that the patent 
draws from various sources, 
increases the likelihood that 
the patent is a fundamental 
rather then incremental 
innovation 
Originality Dispersion of citing patents 
over technology classes 
Indicates that the patent has 
been important for a broad 
field of further research 
Table 1 : Patent quality indicators 
 
These indicators are often used indiscriminately in different sectors and to measure a vague 
and little defined patent quality. However, the indicators capture at best heterogeneous 
phenomena associated with the patents’ quality. For example, the number of claims could 
indicate the breadth of a patent whereas forward cites measure technological significance for 
further research. These specific phenomena could be, according to the field and the aim of the 
study, more or less relevant for patent quality. Thus, these indicators may be, according to the 
sector, considered as more or less suited to a study of a specific situation. Consequently, 
assessing the performance of quality indicators is crucial.  
 
For instance, the performance of the forward cites indicator has been repeatedly assessed and 
confirmed. Trajtenberg (1990-1) shows on a sample of computed tomography patents that 
more highly cited patents contribute more to consumer and producer welfare, Harhoff et al. 
(1999) show that patent holders value higher those of their patents that receive more citations, 
and Giummo (2003) finds that patents more often cited are more likely to be licensed. It has 
furthermore been shown that patents cited more frequently are more likely to be litigated 
(Lanjouw & Schankerman, 1999) or to be included into technological standards (Rysman & 
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Simcoe, 2008). In a different approach, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) carry through a 
factor analysis on four indicators of patent quality and identify a strong covariance with one 
single common factor capturing an important part of the variance in the data. They argue that 
patent “quality” is the only underlying factor that could be thought of to jointly affect the 
number of claims, forward and backward cites and the size of the families. They furthermore 
argue that using a common underlying factor of various indicators rather than a single 
indicator allows reducing the noise and improves the capacities of indicators to approximate 
patent quality. 
 
Probably, the most important challenge to the general use of patent quality indicators is the 
heterogeneity of the patent population. The functions and the mechanisms of patents can vary 
very much according to external factors, such as the type of assignee, the grant year and 
especially the field of technology. It is important in our context to make sure that for instance 
cumulativeness does not affect the capacity of indicators to measure quality adequately. 
 
For several reasons the cumulativeness of a technology field could have an impact on the 
patent indicators of quality. For instance the density of the patent web in a complex industry 
mechanically affects the average number of citations. Independently of its quality, a patent 
will be cited more often if it covers a technological area where the propensity to patent is 
high. For the same reason, a patent in such a dense web will have to cite more previous art 
than a comparable patent in another field of the same technological sector. 
 
Also firm strategies in the context of complex innovation can bias the indicators. Köhler, 
Blind and Thumm (2010) find that patents disclosed as essential to technological standards 
have more claims. Indeed, the existence of overlapping patents could provide incentives to 
raise the number of claims, as increasing the number of claims increases the chances of the 
patent to be relevant to future developments of a jointly held technology. On a different 
stance, overlapping IP in complex technologies may increase firms’ incentives to file 
numerous patents for few innovations, thereby increasing the size of the families. 
 
The fact that all the indicators are driven upwards or downwards in a particular technological 
field does not impede that variance inside a sample of patents from this technological field 
indicates differences in patent quality. For instance, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) in 
their factor analysis of four indicators over samples of patents from different technological 
fields identify a quality factor that is consistent over technological differences. Nevertheless, 
the covariance captured by this factor is lower in electronics, and the relative weights of the 
different indicators included in the factor are different. These results could indicate that even 
though the indicators still evidence a common quality factor in “complex” technology classes, 
they yield less consistent results than in discrete technologies. 
 
We will thus test the consistency of our quality indicators throughout the samples before 
engaging into the econometric analysis of the link between patent quality and value. We want 
to make sure that differences in the link between patent quality indicators and patent value are 
not driven by the fact that the patent quality indicators perform differently well in indicating 
patent quality.  
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I.2 The link between patent quality and value: cumulative vs. 
discrete innovation 
 
Economic research draws a clear distinction between the notion of patent quality and the 
commercial value of the patent (Trajtenberg 1990-2). There are several ways to calculate the 
value of a patent: most important examples are the depreciated sum of expected cash flows, 
the expected sales price of the patent, or the contribution of the patent to the market value of 
the owning firm. The concept of patent value takes into account only the value added of the 
patent for its owner.  
 
Many factors besides the quality or significance can determine a patent’s value. An important 
issue is the ability of the owner to appropriate the value generated by the patent (Trajtenberg 
Henderson & Jaffe, 1997). Even a technologically significant patent can be of low private 
value, when the owner is unable to appropriate the gains generated by the patent. In this case, 
the existence of externalities drives a divide between social and private value of the patent. 
Another possibility is that the owner of the patent does not have the capacities to practice the 
protected technology and market failures impede the sale of the patent at its real value. On the 
other hand even patents protecting only minor technological contributions can be of high 
value to their owner, if additionally to reaping the added value of the protected technology 
they allow leveraging on related innovations.  
 
Several ways how patents leverage on related innovations are studied in the literature. For 
instance economists have come to acknowledge the importance of holding large patent 
portfolios. Indeed, each patent increases the value of the other patents held by the same patent 
owner, as patent portfolios shield the single patents from invalidation claims, leverage 
negotiation power, attract subsequent investment in applied research and increase the patent 
holder’s say in patent politics and decision making (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005).  
 
Many arguments pointing to a divergence between patent quality and patent value relate to the 
cumulativeness of research. For instance, Liu, Arthurs, Cullen and Alexander (2008) find that 
patents relating to sequential innovation held by the same owner are more valuable. In other 
contexts, it has been found that cumulative innovation has an incidence on patent value also 
when the various patents are held by different owners. For instance, a patent holder can 
extract substantial royalties from conduct known as patent ambush or holdup. These are 
practices where a patent holder deceives potential licensees on the existence of his property 
rights or on the extent of his royalty claims until sunk investments are incurred. The incidence 
of real or perceived patent holdup has led to various policy efforts to provide a regulatory 
framework for licensing patents in cumulative technology, most notably technological 
standards, as it is not clear that market mechanisms will yield prices that are in adequate 
proportion to the significance of the patent3.  
 
An assumption underpinning these debates is that the link between patent quality and patent 
value is very important. If the returns on patents are disconnected from the technological 
contribution of the underlying innovation, the efficiency of the patent system as innovation 
                                                 
3
 A recent example is the drastically extended chapter on standardization in the draft guidelines on the 
applicability of European Competition Law to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_horizontals/guidelines_en.pdf 
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reward is at stake. An increasing strand of empirical literature has thus studied the link 
between patent quality and value. Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg (2005) and Nagaoka (2005) 
analyze the correlation between patent quality indicators and the market value of the patent 
owner, and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) and Thomas (1999) analyze the impact of 
patent quality on the probability that a patent is renewed. Consistently, all studies evidence a 
strong link between quality and value, but there is also evidence for strong differences 
between technological fields.  
 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) use a compound factor of quality indicators (claims, 
forward cites, family size and backward cites) to predict patent litigation and renewal as 
measure of private value. They emphasize a strong link between patents’ private value and 
indicators of quality; but this link is less obvious for the electronics sector. Hall et al. (2005) 
underline that the impact of patents weighted by citations on the estimation of firms’ market 
value differs according to the technological sectors. They especially highlight that the impact 
of patent citations on market value is over 50% higher for drugs than the average effect. This 
effect is lower for computers than that for the other sectors. They explain this difference by 
the opposition between complex and discrete technologies:  “Computers and Communications 
is a group of complex product industries where any particular product may rely on various 
technologies embodied in several patents held by different firms. In this industry patents are 
largely valued for negotiating cross-licensing agreements, so their individual quality is not as 
important, although having them is”. On the other hand, Nagaoka (2005) finds that patent 
quality measured by forward citations is more correlated with firm market value in ICT and 
other industries where innovation is cumulative.  
 
All these papers build upon the idea that technologies can be categorized into complex and 
discrete technologies, whereby complex technologies are characterized by a dominance of 
cumulative innovation and a strong incidence of patent thickets4. This distinction originates in 
a paper of Levin & all. from 1987 and has by now been studied by an extensive body of 
research5. This research has established that firm strategies with respect to patents differ from 
complex to discrete technologies (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). In complex technologies, 
many firms use patents for other reasons than excluding their rivals from the use of their 
technology. Most notably, many firms active in complex technologies rely heavily on cross-
licensing agreements to cut their way through patent thickets6 (Giuri, 2010) and engage into 
patent portfolio races (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Hereby patent portfolios play an important 
role as “mass of negotiation”. Thus, the way how patents create value could be different from 
discrete to complex technological fields. The value is no more derived from the right to use or 
to produce the technology but from the possibility to use the patent as a threat of exclusion 
and mass of negotiation. This argument is particularly relevant to specific technological 
sectors such as telecommunications or semi-conductors. 
 
The extant literature thus draws a distinction between complex and discrete technology 
classes that is motivated by the more cumulative nature of innovation in complex 
technologies. Nevertheless, as underlined by Robin Jacob, innovation is in general essentially 
                                                 
4
 Harhoff and von Graevenitz (2009) 
5
 Levin et al. (1987), Merges and Nelson (1990), Kusonoki, Nonaka and Nagata (1998), Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh (2000) 
6
 Patent thickets can be defined as: “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must 
hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” (Shapiro, 2001) 
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cumulative and it is therefore in the nature of the patent system to generate patent thickets7. 
Furthermore, even though differences between technological classes are widely attributed to 
implications of more or less cumulative innovation, there is so far no empirical analysis 
directly relating findings on the level of technological classes to the issue of cumulativeness.  
 
In this paper we will disentangle the effects of cumulativeness from the technological class a 
patent belongs to. In order to do that, we will compare a sample of (complex) patents declared 
as essential to technological standards with a control sample of patents from exactly the same 
(complex) technology classes. Indeed, standardization is a process applying to cumulative 
innovation, as it ensures compatibility between various technological components. Indeed, the 
impact of cumulativeness on the value of the patents is particularly strong for essential patents 
and it seems particularly difficult to establish their value. This is evidenced through an 
extensive literature trying to establish a formula for measuring the value of essential patents 
and giving substance to the formula of Reasonable royalty rates inscribed into the rules of 
Standardization Organizations (Swanson & Baumol, 2005; Salant, 2009).  
 
We will thus directly address the question of the link between quality and value in cumulative 
and discrete innovation. We reproduce findings in the literature by comparing samples of 
complex and discrete technology patents. Introducing a sample of essential patents from the 
same technology classes as the sample of complex patents, we are able to analyze whether the 
differences between classes are effectively due to implications of cumulative innovation. 
Furthermore, we disentangle effects affecting the performance of indicators from effects 
affecting the link between quality and value. We now turn to a description of the construction 
of the database and provide descriptive statistics for the various samples. 
 
 
II. Data and Descriptive statistics 
 
II.1 Construction of the samples and variables 
 
Our objective is to compare cumulative and discrete innovation on samples of complex and 
discrete technologies. As discussed, we introduced a third sample of standardized patents in 
order to highlight how our results are driven by implications of cumulativeness. 
  
As data are most constrained for standardized patents, we first constituted a database of US 
patents that are essential to technological standards. This database is derived from patent 
disclosures at 8 standard setting organizations (SSOs) collected by Rysman and Simcoe and 
from the websites of seven different patent pools (lists of SSOs and patent pools can be found 
in the appendix 3). It comprises overall 3343 essential patents, out of which 993 are part of a 
patent pool.  
 
By merging these patent lists with the NBER patent database, we inform the technology 
classes of 3128 patents and verify that the patents in our database cover technology that is 
                                                 
7
 Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Jacob (2008), “Patents and Pharmaceuticals – a Paper given on 29th November at the 
Presentation of the Directorate-General of Competition’s Preliminary Report of the Pharma-sector inquiry” 
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classified as “complex” according to previous literature8. The concrete classification of 
technological sectors into complex or discrete technologies is still subject to debate. In our 
analysis, we will concentrate on clear cut cases of industries that are classified as complex or 
discrete according to several methodologies. Details on our selection of classes can be found 
in the annex 4. 
 
Based on the remaining patents, we construct a sample of siblings. These are US patents with 
the same application year and the same technology class randomly chosen from the NBER 
patent database. This second sample is what we will call in the following the group of 
complex, non-standardized patents. 
 
Finally, we build up a third sample of discrete patents. These are patents with the same 
application years as the patents in the other two samples, randomly chosen from a large range 
of discrete technology classes in the NBER patent database. The detailed, three-digit 
technology classes of both the complex and the discrete patent samples can be consulted in 
the annex. 
 
Overall, we have 9255 patent observations. The NBER patent database yields information on 
citation flows and other important variables. We inform the number of forward cites 
(including and excluding self-cites), backward cites as well as the generality and originality 
indices, both building upon citation data. We furthermore retrieve the number of claims, the 
application year and the grant year. We complete this information on patents using the 
website of the European Patent Office www.espacenet.com, where we retrieve the size of the 
patent families and indications on renewals. 
 
By merging the patent database with our own disclosure database, we obtain the concrete 
technological standard that 1.509 patents are essential to and the dates of disclosure. If one 
patent is disclosed as essential to several standards, we retain only the standard of the first 
disclosure. For every standard, we calculate the mean of the disclosure dates of all essential 
patents. For every patent, we generate an age_of_disclosure variable, defined as the difference 
between the disclosure date and the mean disclosure date for this particular standard. For the 
993 pool patents, we use an earlier database including an age_of_input variable, defined as 
the difference between the date of input of a given patent and the date of input of the first 
patent in the pool. Even though differently constructed, age_of_disclosure and age_of_input 
both allow studying the chronological order of patents that are essential for the same 
technology.  
 
Finally, using the Stanford IP litigation database (www.lexmachina.org), we generate a 
dummy variable - litigated - which gives 1 if the patent has been cited in at least one law suit 
in the database. 
  
II.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we will use the comprehensive database to provide descriptive statistics on the 
predictions of the theory on cumulative innovation. The results in table 2 are consistent with 
many arguments drawn from the literature on cumulative innovation: indeed, in line with the 
hypothesis that the cumulative nature of innovation in complex industries drives up citation 
                                                 
8
 See von Graevenitz, Wagner and Harhoff (2009) or Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) 
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rates, both backward and forward cite rates are significantly higher in the complex than in the 
non-complex random sample, whereas the scores for claims are not significantly different, 
and family size is much bigger in the discrete sample. Furthermore, we confirm previous 
findings that the litigation rate is indeed higher in complex than in discrete industries (1.4 
compared to 1 %). This could hint to the fact that patents are indeed used in a slightly more 
“litigious” way in complex industries, and corroborates the argument that patents generate 
value in a different way from complex to discrete technological fields. Furthermore, higher 
renewal rates on complex technology patents also provide evidence that less patents are of 
low value to their owners in complex technologies.   
 
Citation rates are even much higher in the sample of essential patents than among random 
complex technology patents. On the one hand, this could indicate that patents in this sample 
are even more cumulative than the average of their technological field. On the other hand, as 
these patents score high also on all the other quality indicators and on renewal and litigation 
rate, the high citation rate seems at least partly to be driven by a selection effect: essential 
patents are highly cited, because they are better than average patents from their technological 
field. In the remainder of the analysis, we will have to control for this selection effect, as we 
want to rule out that results that we attribute to cumulativeness result from selection. 
 
Furthermore, these descriptive statistics call for a cautious use of quality indicators when 
comparing the different samples. Consistently with the argument that claims are driven up in 
cumulative innovation in order to maximize the chances of blocking successive research 
paths, we find the average number of claims to be higher for essential patents. Furthermore, 
family size is bigger on average in the sample of essential patents, which provides some 
support to the argument that numerous patents are filed on single inventions in order to inflate 
patent portfolios. Finally, as discussed, high citation rates among essential patents could result 
from the fact that these patents relate to technological fields where the general propensity to 
patent is high, which results in prior art protected by a higher number of patents. Before 
interpreting the indicator scores in terms of quality, we therefore turn to an extensive factor 
analysis to rule out that such noise on single indicators affects our results. 
 
 
 
 
Complete sample 
 
Discrete technologies 
 
Complex non standardized  
technologies 
Complex standardized 
technologies 
 
Mean 
  
Standard 
deviation 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Allnscites 23,35 42,76 8,58 15,42 20,93 36,66 40,15 57,86 
Backward 
cites 9,30 14,12 7,28 9,67 8,87 15,38 11,72 16,18 
Claims 16,85 15,09 15,19 14,07 15,77 12,92 19,66 17,54 
Family size 15,66 46,33 13,64 40,15 6,51 17,88 24,75 62,67 
Generality 0,35 0,37 0,22 0,34 0,39 0,37 0,43 0,35 
Originality 0,23 0,24 0,14 0,22 0,26 0,25 0,25 0,22 
Renewal at 8 0,73 0,44 0,59 0,49 0,73 0,44 0,95 0,21 
Renewal at 12 0,57 0,50 0,37 0,48 0,55 0,50 0,92 0,27 
Litigated  0,03 0,17 0,01 0,10 0,01 0,12 0,07 0,25 
 
Table 2 : Descriptive statistics of indicators 
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III.  Are indicators consistent for different technologies: 
the principal factor analysis 
 
 
The aim of this part is to compare the stability of indicators among different technological 
sectors. In order to study the consistence of the indicators, we will use a factor analysis. 
Factor analysis is a way to describe variability among observed variables through a smaller 
number of underlying variables called factors. Factor analysis is concerned with the common 
covariance of the variables and estimates how much of the variability is due to common 
factors.  
Thus, the factor analysis uses a large number of observations and reveals common patterns 
underlying the variables. For instance, factor analysis is a method regularly used in political 
sciences to highlight the unobserved political convictions of surveyed people using their 
expressed opinion on various societal problems. In economics, factor analysis is used when 
capturing a common phenomenon is more interesting than analyzing individual variables. For 
example, it is a method used for a very long time to capture the growth phenomenon of a 
country9. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) first used the principal factor analysis to identify 
an overall patent quality factor through four indicators.  
In this part we will use the factor analysis for our three samples: discrete, complex 
standardized and complex non standardized technologies. The objective is to study the 
stability of the different indicators according to the technological sectors and see if a common 
pattern exists.  
 
We first run a factor on four indicators frequently used to assess the “quality” of a patent 
namely the number of forward cites, the number of claims, the number of backward cites and 
the family size of the patent. We only make the comparison for the discrete and complex 
samples in order to revisit precedent results on the subject (Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004)). 
Our results on this first factor analysis (presented in annex 1) are very closed to the previous 
results using the same method.  We highlight that the impact of forward cites on the common 
factor 1 is more important for non complex technologies than for complex technologies. 
Inversely, the impact of the number of claims is more important in the case of complex 
technologies. We can also highlight that the common covariance explained by factor 1 is less 
important in the case of complex technologies.  
 
We then perform the same principal factor analysis using two new indicators: the originality  
and the generality of the patent. The generality and originality, measured by the number of 
forward or backward cites between the patent and patents from other technological classes, 
can get an idea of the patents’ interest for broader technological applications (Hall & all., 
2001). We run this factor analysis on our three samples to compare the stability of the 
indicators according to the technological sectors. The following table summarizes the 
loadings for each sample.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 For more information on applying these method to the data on a countrys’ growth, see Adelman I. and Taft 
Morris C., « A Factor Analysis of the Interrelationship Between Social and Political Variables and Per Capita 
Gross National Product », The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Nov., 1965), pp. 555-578 
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 Discrete technologies Complex non standardized 
technologies 
Complex Standardized 
Technologies 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Variance 0.48807 0.24936 0.26113 0.24636 0.47470 0.28419 
Forward 
cites 
0.4532 0.0021 0.3029 0.1377 0.2139 0.3903 
Backward 
cites 
0.3549 0.0762 0.4036 -0.0143 -0.0722 0.0685 
Claims 0.2383 -0.0049 0.4197 0.0469 0.0563 0.3745 
Originality  -0.0794 0.3629 -0.0286 0.3467 0.4441 0.0759 
Generality 0.0370 0.3662 0.1113 0.3276 0.3828 0.1426 
Family size 0.4174 -0.0950 0.2102 0.0289 -0.0677 0.1463 
Number of 
observations 
3139 3004 3191 
 
Table 3 : Loadings factor analysis six indicators 
 
Table 3 is useful to emphasize some conclusions on the stability of indicators. The first result 
is that there are two main factors underlying these indicators. A first factor is mainly 
correlated to the number of forward cites, claims and to some extent backward cites and 
family size. This first factor has already been discussed in the literature (Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, 2004) and named “quality”. We will thus continue to call it this way. Table 
also stresses the existence of a second factor, having an important impact on the indicators 
common covariance, for both the complete and discrete samples. This second factor is mainly 
linked to the generality and the originality of the patent. For complex patents (as opposed to 
the discrete sample), this second factor also has significant loadings on the citation indicators. 
A plausible interpretation would be that this factor discriminates between fundamental and 
incremental innovations; which could be the reason why it is particularly linked to the 
generality and originality of the patent but also with the number of cites in the case of 
complex technologies. According to the existing literature (Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe, 
1997), we will use the denomination “basicness factor”. For the complex standardized sample, 
this basicness factor significantly drives the common covariance of the indicators. It becomes 
the most important factor for this sample and the quality factor is overshadowed.  
 
In spite of the presence of a second factor that is especially important in samples of 
cumulative patents, we identify a quality factor that is roughly consistent throughout the 
samples. In all three samples, the quality factor is driven by a positive correlation between 
forward cites, claims and family size. Nevertheless, the loadings of indicators are slightly 
different between complex and discrete technologies. The number of claims seems to have 
more impact than the number of forward cites on the quality factor for the complex sample. It 
is exactly the opposite in the case of discrete technologies, where the most important indicator 
is the number of forward cites. Another point on the loadings of the quality factor is the 
greater importance of the backward cites for the complex non standardized sample than for 
the discrete sample. This indicator is often considered as a way to assess the patent holder 
investment in the patent refinement. It could thus be a way to discriminate in complex 
technologies between patents resulting from less significant innovation effort. Therefore it is 
interesting to note that this indicator is strongly linked to the first factor “quality” in the case 
of complex non standardized technologies. For the complex standardized sample, the quality 
factor remains the same except for the backward cites. Indeed, backward citations play no role 
in the definition of the factor. This strengthens our intuition that backward citations are 
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mainly useful for screening out low quality patents. We are confident that in our sample of 
essential patents the share of low quality patents is far below average. 
Another important difference is the variance explained by the quality factor between the 
complex and discrete sample. Indeed, we can underline that this quality factor explains almost 
fifty percent of the covariance of the indicators for the discrete sample. However, in the 
complex samples, this factor only explains one fourth of the common covariance of the 
indicators.  
 
For the basicness factor, we use data on the timing of declaration or introduction of patents 
into standard setting organizations and patent pools to corroborate our interpretation. We 
created two new variables, founding patent pool, which equals 1 if the patent is a pool 
founding patent and founding_patent_sso which equals 1 if the patent was disclosed before 
the average age of patent disclosure to the respective standard. These variables allow us to 
discriminate between fundamental and incremental innovations. The underlying assumption is 
that founding patents of a pool or a standardization project are more fundamental. We run a 
regression with the two variables founding patent pool and founding_patent_sso as explained 
variable and the factors highlighted in this section as the explanatory variables. The results are 
presented in table 6 (appendix 4). They show that both factors are related to being a founding 
patent. The results on the basicness factor stress that being a founding patent of a pool or a 
standardization project is significantly linked to a high score on the factor. This could confirm 
our interpretation that this factor discriminates between fundamental and incremental 
innovations. The quality factor is also significantly associated with the likelihood of being a 
founding patent. This confirms that founding patents of a standardization process are of better 
quality than patents disclosed later in the process (see Baron & Delcamp, 2010). 
 
To sum up our main conclusions, we can say that the factor analysis underlines the existence 
of two factors driving the common covariance of the indicators. The first one, mainly linked 
to the traditional indicators of quality has already been studied in the literature. The second 
one is mainly driven by the generality and originality of the patent. We call it the basicness or 
fundamentality factor and give some evidence corroborating our interpretation. For the 
complex standardized sample, this basicness factor explains almost half of the common 
covariance of the indicators.  The quality factor seems to remain stable (with some minor 
changes on claims and forward cites) across our three different samples except for the 
importance of the backward cites. Indeed, the weight on this indicator on the quality factor is 
important and stable for both our discrete and complex non standardized sample but does not 
have any importance for the complex standardized sample.  
In the next section, we will look at the ability of these factors especially the quality one to 
predict the private value of the patent. In order to assess the private value of a patent, we will 
use data on renewals and litigations. To take into account the finding on the unstability of 
backward cites on the quality factor, we will use a common quality factor compound of 
forward cites, claims and family size.  
 
 
IV. The link between patent quality and private value in 
discrete and cumulative innovation 
 
As discussed in part I, we expect that the link between indicators of patent quality and patent 
value is weakened when patents are cumulative. The literature identifies complex 
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technologies where innovation is in general thought to be more cumulative, for instance 
electronics and telecommunication. Even though the question has never been explicitly 
addressed, several arguments in the empirical literature point to a weaker link between patent 
quality and patent value in some classes identified as complex. We will test the theory of a 
significant difference as to the private value of patents and its link to patent quality between 
complex and discrete technology patents. Specifically, we will estimate the value of patents in 
an ordered logistic regression estimation of patent renewals. Comparing samples of complex 
and discrete technology patents, we will test whether the common patent quality factor is less 
explanatory of patent value in complex technologies. We also analyze whether patents in 
complex technologies are more valuable than patents in discrete technologies of the same 
patent quality. 
 
Second, we test more directly for the effects of cumulative innovation by introducing a 
sample of patents declared essential to technological standards. As explained above, 
standardization is a procedure to ensure compatibility between complementary technologies. 
It is therefore by definition part of a cumulative innovation effort. Standardization can also be 
analyzed as a strategy of firms to navigate through the patent thicket. Essential patents are 
those patents that are necessarily infringed by any implementation of the standard. The 
blocking potential of essential patents is therefore extended to the whole standard. We have 
thus argued that if cumulative innovation weakens the link between patent quality and patent 
value, this should clearly be seen in the case of essential patents. Therefore we test directly 
whether patent quality contributes less to patent value in the case of essential patents, and 
whether essential patents are more valuable than non-essential patents of the same quality. 
 
We thus estimate the following baseline equation:  
 
    (1) 
where V represents patent value, measured through  an ordered logistic regression of the 
probability of patent renewal. Q represents patent quality, measured by the quality factor established in 
part III.1. X is a vector of control variables, including application year and assignee dummies. C is a 
constant and ε is a stochastic error term.  
 
We introduce dummies for complex technologies and essential patents. Both dummies are 
interacted with patent quality. 
 
(2) 
 
 Hypothesis 1: 
  >  0 and β' > 0, there is a premium for patents in cumulative innovation, therefore 
patents in complex technologies (respectively essential patents) are more valuable than 
patents of the same quality in discrete innovation   
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Hypothesis 2: 
  < 0 and γ' < 0, patent quality is less important for patent value in cumulative 
innovation. 
 
 
Ordered logistic regression 
renewals 
Ordered logistic regression 
renewals 
Quality factor 
 
 
1.1307099***   
(0,259) 
1.1559108***  
(0,264) 
Basicness factor 
  
 
-.05613295  
(0,155) 
Dummy standardized 
 
 
1.7132462***    
(0,280) 
1.744291***  
(0,335) 
Dummy complex 
 
 
.56856639***  
(0,128) 
.65117365***  
(0,139) 
Interaction 
Quality_standardized 
 
-1.4333137**  
(0,540) 
-1.4228873*  
(0,594) 
Interaction 
Quality_complex 
  
.48543312  
(0,349) 
.59521786  
(0,361) 
Interaction  
Basicness_standardized  
 
-.35715422  
(0,738) 
Interaction  
Basicness_complex  
 
-.24520092  
(0,235) 
 
Control Application year Y Y 
Control Assignee Y 
 
Y 
 
Number of obs 1637 1637 
  
Wald chi2 260.31  258.76 
 
Prob > chi2 0.0000  0.0000 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0859  0.0870 
 
Table 4: The link between quality and value for cumulative and discrete innovation 
 
Table 4 allows underlining a couple of results. First of all, patent quality is an important part 
of the definition of patent value. The parameter for the quality_factor variable is positive and 
significant for our two models. The link between value and a compound factor of quality is 
verified in our case. 
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Hypothesis 1 is also verified, there is a premium for patents in cumulative innovations. Thus 
patents in complex technologies (and within complex technologies, essential patents) are 
more valuable than patents of the same quality and presenting the same characteristics in 
discrete technologies. Hypothesis 2 is verified for essential patents, the parameter 
interaction_quality_standardized is negative and significant. Therefore, the quality takes a 
smaller share in the definition of patent value for cumulative innovation (i.e. the link between 
quality and value is less obvious for cumulative innovation). But hypothesis 2 is not verified 
for the overall complex sample. Thus, the quality factor predicts renewal in discrete and 
complex, but not in standardized samples. We verify that this is not due to a selection effect. 
Indeed, one could argue that quality indicators are less informative of patent value in a sample 
of essential patents, as all these patents are selected and their quality and value is above 
average. Nevertheless, we control for selection effects by excluding all patents from the 
analysis that have never been renewed, by restricting the samples to patents that have been 
litigated, by dropping all patents from the sample that that have a quality factor score above 
average, and by introducing the square of the quality factor as a control variable to control for 
non-linear effects. There is no evidence for non-linear effects of patent quality on patent value 
throughout the sample, and our results hold under all the different control strategies (The 
results are available upon request from the authors). As we can rule out that our results are 
driven by a selection effect, it is thus clearly cumulativeness that alters the way how patents 
generate value. Nevertheless, this cumulativeness is rather unrelated to technological classes, 
as random patents from exactly the same technology classes as the essential patents do not 
exhibit any weakened link between patent quality and value. 
Table 7 (appendix 5) allows refining the previous results. We run the same regression as in 
table 4 for each quality indicator individually. For model 1, we use in the same regression all 
the quality indicators together as explanatory variable. The parameters therefore allow 
assessing the indicators’ impact everything else equal. Model 2 reports the parameters for 
each indicator used individually as explanatory variable. We present this model because 
indicators are more often used individually especially by policymakers or patent experts. In 
order to check the robustness to the way how we measure patent value, we also introduce 
patent litigation as an alternative indicator. 
Table 7 confirms that quality indicators, especially forward cites, claims and family size are 
good predictors of patent value (measured by litigation or renewal) for discrete and complex 
non-standardized technologies.  The number of claims works well for predicting the value of 
complex non-standardized patents but not for discrete technologies. This confirms our 
previous results on the difference in the quality factor between complex and discrete 
technologies: the number of claims becomes more informative than the forward cites for 
complex technologies. The main result is that no indicator works for predicting the patent 
value for complex standardized technologies. This is in line with our hypothesis that 
cumulativeness disrupts the link between quality and value. The most important difference is 
not between complex and discrete technological classes, but within complex technologies.  
 
V. Implications for policy and research methodology 
 
We have demonstrated a very significant and robust relationship between patent quality and 
value. Nevertheless, this robust relationship completely disappears in highly cumulative 
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innovation, as demonstrated using a sample of patents declared essential to technological 
standards. While these patents are clearly better on average and more valuable than the 
control patents, quality plays no role for explaining differences in patent value inside the 
sample. 
The lesson to be drawn from this insight is twofold: on the one hand, our findings allow 
revisiting the patent portfolio theory for cumulative innovation. As to the portfolio theory, 
patents are valuable as such, independently of their quality or any other measurable patent 
characteristics. This has strong implications for patent filing incentives and innovation 
strategies. The primary determinant of patent value is the capacity of blocking other patents. 
We have shown in our empirical work that patents with blocking power over a standard are 
much more valuable than other patents in the same technological field of comparable quality. 
Furthermore, among these essential patents with blocking power over a standard, patent 
quality is no longer a determinant of patent value. Therefore, patent holders have incentives 
not to pursue patent quality, as long as they can achieve blocking power over the standard. 
This finding provides support to those who see the surge in essential patents with some 
worries. However, we also showed that essential patents are still much better in terms of any 
quality indicator than control patents, so that we can conclude that the selection mechanism at 
work during standardization is not defunct.  
On the other hand, our results suggest that the link between patent quality and value is quite 
robust over technology classes. This means that while cumulative innovation alters the way 
how patents generate value in relatively narrow, highly cumulative sectors identified through 
formal standardization, this does not affect the relevant technology classes as a whole. Indeed, 
our sample of complex technology patents drawn from exactly the same classes as the 
essential patents does not exhibit a weakened link between patent quality and value. This 
suggests that the effects of cumulative innovation are important only in narrow yet highly 
relevant technological fields. 
This latter finding is important for appreciating the implications for research methodology. 
Indeed, we find no evidence that patent quality indicators are less informative in complex than 
in discrete technological classes. Patent quality predicts renewal decisions and litigation even 
more accurately in our sample of (randomly chosen) complex technology patents. Comparing 
single indicator, we confirm previous findings that claims are a more informative indicator 
than forward citations when studying complex technologies. 
In turn, the indicators behave very differently in the sample of essential patents. First, none of 
the studied indicators predicts patent renewals or litigation with any accuracy. We conclude 
that it is erroneous to use indicators of patent quality such as forward citations or claims to 
approximate the value of essential patents. Second, the indicators seem to be mainly driven by 
an underlying factor that is different from patent “quality” or importance. We have interpreted 
this factor as “basicness” of the patent and highlighted some evidence for this interpretation. 
We thus find that observable patent characteristics are not informative of patent value in the 
case of cumulative innovation and that the characteristics of these patents are driven by 
factors that are orthogonal to patent quality or significance. This is bad news, as it implies that 
indicators of patent quality or importance function the worse where the industry most needs 
them. Indeed, pooling of patents, cross licensing schemes and other clearing mechanisms 
widely practiced for highly relevant cumulative innovations are dependent upon objective and 
clear criteria for establishing royalty sharing rates. Our analysis reveals that at least the 
candidate indicators most commonly used in the literature are of no use to this respect. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The factor analysis of four indicators  
 
 
The following table summarizes the results of a principal factor analysis of the four main 
indicators of patent quality used by Lanjouw & Schankerman.  
 
 
 
 Discrete technologies Complex technologies 
Variance 0.52903 0.07807 0.31715 0.23077   
allnscites 0.4456 0.1267 0.3053 0.1541 
cmade 0.3543 0.1614 0.2875 0.3087 
claims 0.2311 0.1825 0.3462 0.1783 
familysize 0.3893 0.0518 0.1464   0.2827 
Number of observations 3139 3004 
 
Table 5: Factor analysis four indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
Appendix 2 
 
List non complex technology classes 
 
 
19 Textiles:  Fiber Preparation 
26 Textiles: Cloth Finishing 
28 Textiles:  Manufacturing 
29 Metal Working 
38 Textiles:  Ironing or Smoothing 
44 Fuel and Related Compositions 
57 Textiles:  Spinning, Twisting, and Twining 
66 Textiles:  Knitting 
68 Textiles:  Fluid Treating Apparatus 
71 Chemistry: Fertilizers 
75 
Specialized Metallurgical Processes, Compositions for Use Therein, Consolidated Metal 
Powder Compositions, and Loose Metal Particulate Mixtures 
76 Metal Tools and Implements, Making 
87 Textiles: Braiding, Netting, and Lace Making 
99 Foods and Beverages: Apparatus 
100 Presses 
 
101 Printing 
 
135 Tent, Canopy, Umbrella, or Cane 
139 Textiles:  Weaving 
148 Metal Treatment 
162 Paper Making and Fiber Liberation 
164 Metal Founding 
228 Metal Fusion Bonding 
229 Envelopes, Wrappers, and Paperboard Boxes 
423 Chemistry of Inorganic Compounds 
424 Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
429 Chemistry:  Electrical Current Producing Apparatus, Product, and Process 
435 Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology 
436 Chemistry: Analytical and Immunological Testing 
514 Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
518 Chemistry:  Fischer-Tropsch Processes; or Purification or Recovery of Products Thereof 
585 Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds 
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List technology classes of standardized patents 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
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Apendix 3 
 
 
List of pools 
 
 
 
 1394 
 DVD 6C 
 MPEG 2 
 MPEG 4 Systems 
 MPEG 4 Visual 
 AVC  
 DVB-T 
 
 
 
 
List of Standard Setting Organizations 
 
 
 
 American National Standard Institute 
 Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Standards 
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
 Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
  Internet Engineering Task Force,  
 International Organization for Standards International Electrotechnical Commission 
 International Telecommunications Union  
 Telecommunications Industry Association  
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Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Probit Founding patent SSO Founding patent pool 
Fundamentality factor 
 
.24171685***   
(0.127) 
0.25693* 
(0.127) 
Quality factor 
 
.5337134***  
(0.196) 
0.50440** 
(0.196) 
Age effect 
 
.08695842*  
(0.094) 
0.16499 
(0.094) 
Dummy Assignee control Y Y 
_cons 
-173.91463*  
(187.164) 
- 327.86429 
(187.164) 
Number of obs 2601 369 
Wald chi2(22) 217.33 86.89 
Prob > chi2 0 0 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard erros in parentheses 
 
Table 6: Interpretation basicness factor 
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Appendix 5 
 Discrete technologies Complex non standardized technologies Standardized Technologies 
  
Litigated 
 
 
Renewed at 8 
 
Litigated 
 
Renewed at 8 
 
Litigated 
 
Renewed at 8 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Forward 
cites 
 
0.008* 
(0.003)   
 
0.009*** 
(0.0293) 
 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
0.011*** 
(0.0120) 
 
0,005*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.005*** 
(0.0636) 
 
0,006*** 
 
0.005** 
(0.0154) 
 
-0,001 
(0.001) 
 
0.001 
(0.0179) 
 
-0,001 
(0.002) 
 
0.001 
(0.0062) 
 
Backward 
cites 
 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
 
-0.004 
(0.0105) 
 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
 
0.003 
(0.0003) 
 
0,010* 
(0.004) 
 
0.008** 
(0.0382) 
 
-0,004 
 
0.002 
(0.0003) 
 
-0,003 
(0.004) 
 
0.001 
(0.0029) 
 
-0,019 
(0.006) 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.0272) 
 
Claims 
 
0.005 
(0.006) 
 
0.006 
(0.0099) 
 
0.007 
(0.003) 
 
0.008**  
(0.0037) 
 
0,001 
(0.008) 
 
0.013**  
( 0.0361) 
 
0,012** 
 
0.014** 
(0.0114) 
 
0,005 
(0.004) 
 
0.002 
(0.0229) 
 
0,007 
(0.008) 
 
0.005 
(0.0039) 
 
Originality 
 
-0.708 
(0.539)    
 
-0.240 
(0.0242) 
 
-0.286 
(0.136) 
 
-0.173 
(0.0007) 
 
0,770 
(0.513) 
 
0.571 
(0.0234) 
 
-0,010 
 
-0.113 
(0.0004) 
 
0,889* 
(0.352) 
 
0.330 
(0.0058) 
 
-0,936 
(0.921) 
 
-0.889* 
(0.0204) 
 
Generality 
 
0.211 
(0.290)    
 
0.229 
(0.0128) 
 
0.233 
(0.093) 
 
0.300** 
(0.0057) 
 
0,668 
(0.568) 
 
0.506* 
(0.0224) 
 
-0,116 
 
0.109 
(0.0007) 
 
0,026 
(0.229) 
 
0.108 
(0.0136) 
 
-1,020 
(0.720) 
 
0.027 
(0.0000) 
 
Family size 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
0.001* 
(0.0098) 
 
0.007* 
(0.002) 
 
0.012*** 
(0.0147) 
 
0,004 
(0.002) 
 
0.006* 
(0.0365) 
 
0,023** 
 
0.014 
(0.0078) 
 
0,001 
(0.001) 
 
0.001* 
(0.0204) 
 
0,014 
(0.007) 
 
0.005 
(0.0067) 
 
Age control 
 
Y 
 
Y 
   
Y 
 
Y 
   
Y 
 
Y 
  
 
Number of 
observations 
 
2853 
 
2853 
 
2853 
 
2853 
 
3004 
 
3004 
 
3004 
 
3004 
 
3191 
 
3191 
 
3191 
 
3191 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard erros in parentheses 
 
